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Man's environment consists of a multitude of potential stimuli 
demanding his attention. According to Burke (1968) those things to 
which man unconsciously reacts define the realm of motion, while 
I 
those things upon which he chooses to act define the realm of 
symbolic behavior. When man interprets the nature of the world 
around him, he is defining a symbolic reality for himself. Human 
transactions occur when he acts in accord with that symbolic reality. 
Messages constitute one of the most important sources of man's 
symbolic reality and symbolic behavior. When man interprets messages 
he utilizes symbolic processes to form linkages between recommendations 
(potential effects) and possible causes. These symbolic linkages, 
known as attributions, define the situation that the individual faces 
and in turn influence his resulting behavior. 
Attributions and Persuasion 
When a receiver is confronted with a persuasion attempt, he may 
ask two questions in his attempt to understand the situation· 1) "Why 
should I do it?" and 2) "Can I do it?" or "What will the outcome be 
if I do it?" The first of these questions centers on the intentions 
and motives of the person, while the second concerns the person's 
ability to act 
Fritz Heider (1958) proposed a similar distinction in his discussion 
of the "naive" analysis of action. He argued that an individual's 
inferences about the cause of an action are the result of his analysis of 
ability ("can") and intention ("try"). Furthermore, he viewed "can" as 
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a function of "personal power" and "environmental force," and "try" 
as a function of "exertion" and "intention." 
Harold Kelley (1967) has directly speculated about the relationship 
between attributions and persuasion when he specified two types of 
attributional social influence. The first type, instruction, is a 
"can" centered form of influence that attempts to show that the message's 
recommendation will lead to some consistent way of dealing with the 
world (a stable ability). The second type, persuasion, adds the 
additional element of "try" in terms of the potential rewards for the 
persuader and the receiver (intention). Thus, both Heider and Kelley 
see the individual faced with behavior as asking the questions "why?" 
and "can?" in an attempt to understand and respond to the situation. 
The answers to the questions "why?" and "can?" fall into two 
broad categories. Heider (1944, 1958) first suggested this distinction 
when he argued attributions are made to internal causes and to external 
causes (these categories should not be taken as absolute, but instead 
as general classifications within which and across which attributions 
can be made). Internal causes are those which are part of the personality 
makeup of the person making the inference and external causes are 
those which are part of the world outside him. When the external 
cause is not a person, the distinction becomes one of a situational-
dispositional dichotomy. However, in most persuasion situations the 
distinction is between something internal to the receiver (e.g. his 
own intentions or abilities) or something external to him (e.g. 
another person or some situational constraint). Thus, in most 
persuasion situations, the individual asks two basic questions about 
causality, "why?" and "can?" and finds answers to them either within 
himself or outside himself. 
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Some theoretical and empirical attempts have been made to predict 
what types of causes will be attributed to certain effects. Kelley 
(1967) has proposed that people form attributions according to a 
covariance principle whereby people attribute effects to the causes 
with which they covary over time. The criteria by which individuals 
Judge whether a cause covaries over time with an effect are: 1) 
consistency over time and modality, 2) distinctiveness of entity, 
and 3) social consensus among people. MacArthur (1972) tested this 
formulation in an impression formation situation. She presented 
subJects with information about people and situations according to 
Kelley's principles andmeasuredthe resultant types of causal 
attributions that were made. MacArthur found that information about 
consistency, distinctiveness and social consensus did induce people 
to make different attributions than were made by people who were Just 
given information about a single behavioral event. She found evidence 
to support Kelley's hypotheses that internal attributions to a person 
would result from information which showed the person making few 
discriminations among entities of a class (low distinctiveness), 
being very consistent in reacting to an entity over time and modality 
(high consistency), and in agreement with few other people in reacting 
to the entity (low consensus). Attributions external to the actor 
were found to result from information showing the individual reacting 
selectively to entities of a class (high distinctiveness), reacting 
consistently to the entity over time and modality (high consistency), 
and reacting in a manner consistent with other people (high consensus). 
Attributions and Behavior 
An important distinction needs to me made at this point between 
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attributions that are made before a behavior occurs (a before paradigm) 
and attributions that are made after the behavior occurs (an after 
paradigm). Most research on the attribution process has occurred 
within an after paradigm following the manner of dissonance theory 
research. However, most persuasion situations call for an individual 
to make a choice which in turn leads to some behavior. In many 
instances, the choice will involve first making attributions about 
causality in the situation, e.g. "Do I want to do this?" "Am I 
capable of doing it?" When this occurs attributions are being made 
in a before paradigm. This situation has been modeled by Lopes (1972) 
in the first part of an information integration model (Anderson, 1971) 
for attitude attribution. The model has two stages: 1) an initial 
stage in which an expectation is formed of what the person's attitude 
will be based on freedom of choice and prior probability (role or 
reference group) and 2) a second stage where the expectation is 
compared with the actual behavior of the person, A before paradigm 
is primarily concerned with the first stage of this model and an after 
paradigm takes into account both stages. A before paradigm is relevant 
to the persuasion situation when something makes information processing 
about the nature of the situation salient to the receiver, There are 
many possible reasons why such information processing might become 
salient to a receiver (e.g. see Kiesler's theory of stimulus incon-
gruity, 1973; Jones and Nisbett's work with the actor and the observer, 
1971; and Duval and Wicklund's work with obJective self awareness, 
1973), but the important thing is that when it does, a before paradigm 
for attributions is appropriate. 
It is argued here that when an attribution is made to an internal 
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or external cause at any point in the persuasion process, the resulting 
type of behavior. Davison and Valins (1969) proposed that behavior 
changes which are believed to be brought about by oneself will be 
maintained to a greater degree than behavior changes which are believed 
to be due to some external force or agent. In line with this thesis, 
they found that subJects who attributed a behavior change (increased 
ability to withstand shock) to themselves, subsequently perceived 
that shocks were less painful and tolerated significantly more than 
subJects who attributed their behavior change to a drug. Thus, when 
a person perceives that the ability to withstand shock is due to his 
own internal makeup, then he is more likely to be able to maintain 
that immunity than if he attributes the ability to something external. 
Kraut (1973) found support for the effect of dispositional labeling 
as opposed to no labeling in an experiment involving contributions to 
charity. He found that when a donor or nondonor was labeled with a 
dispositional trait (such as charitable or uncharitable) that a 
markedly different behavior response was obtained in future charity 
situations than when no label was applied to the person. In other 
words, dispositional labeling was found to affect behavior in a 
negative direction when an uncharitable label was used and in a 
positive direction when a charitable label was used. (However, 
caution must be used in interpreting these findings because of the 
possible effect of reinforcement and the fact that only the effect 
of dispositional labeling and not situational labeling was assessed). 
When the behavior in question is verbal, as in attitudes, then 
there is also support for the idea that differential attributions 
have an effect upon the resultant behavior. Jones and Davis (1965) 
have developed a theory of "correspondent inferences" which argues 
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that a person's attitude will be seen to correspond to his behavior 
(as seen by an observer) when the prior probability of the behavior 
is low and the person's freedom of choice is high. That is, an internal 
attribution is made (e.g. the person acted in accordance with his 
own attitudes, not because he had to) when external forces are not 
strong (reducing the probability of behavior and preserving freedom 
of choice). When this theory is applied to a persuasion situation 
(or a before paradigm) and to an individual's view of himself, it 
predicts that a person is likely to see his attitudes as being linked 
to his future behavior and thus influencing it when he perceives his 
own behavior as having low probability and high freedom of choice. 
For example, an individual who is planning on voting for a certain 
candidate after listening to a message is more likely to see his own 
attitude as causing the behavior when he has never voted for a Republican 
before (low prior probability) and he has been exposed to messages 
from both candidates with no external cause strong enough to force his 
behavior (high freedom of choice). The influence of prior probability 
was illustrated by Steiner and Field (1960) in a study where people 
were better able to infer a person's attitude from his behavior when 
he was not acting consistently with his role. Later studies have also 
demonstrated this effect (Jones and Harris, 1967; Jones, Worchel, 
Goethals, and Grumet, 1971). 
In summary, previous research has shown that attributions made 
to behavior that has already occurred affect an individual's future 
behavior. In general, internal attributions seem to bring about greater 
commitment and longer lasting effects. It is proposed here that 
attributions also mediate the persuasion process and thereby influence 
the individual's behavior. That is, attributions which follow a 
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message and attach cause to potential future behavior will affect that 
future behavior. If so, one would expect that when a person attributes 
a potential effect to an internal cause rather than an external cause, 
that more probable and longer lasting behavior change will occur. 
Attributions and Forms of Behavior 
The discussion up to this point has considered behavior as a 
unitary concept, however a distinction must be made between verbal 
behavior and overt behavior. In many ways behavior can be considered 
as lying on a continuum ranging from surface opinions on one end to 
the most momentous life acts on the other end with a slight gap lying 
somewhere in the middle providing a formal separation between verbal 
behavior and overt behavior. 
Verbal behavior is a term that has become the dependent measure 
of such constructs as attitudes and beliefs. It is the oral or 
written form of these cognitive concepts. Much attention has been 
focused on the technical scaling and measurement of this concept. 
Overt behavior refers to the physical actions of a person in 
some situation. It can take innumerable different forms and in many 
ways is considered the end that social science is seeking to study. 
Technical forms of measurement for overt behavior have received much 
less attention than verbal behavior with single scale measures 
receiving primary attention. 
The main reason for making the distinction between verbal 
behavior and overt behavior lies with the large body of literature 
which seems to show a lack of relationship between the two concepts 
(Festinger, 1964; Wicker, 1969). If this finding is true then the 
relationship between each of these measures and attributions needs 
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to be discussed. 
The crucial question for these distinctions lies in whether 
each variable lies under the perceived control of external forces 
or internal forces. In most instances of research on this question 
verbal behavior can be seen to lie under the control of internal 
forces (e.g. beliefs, values) while overt behavior is more influenced 
by external forces. Under such circumstances there is no reason to 
believe that the two variables should be consistent,which is what is 
usually found. Only when both verbal behavior and overt behavior are 
perceived as under the same type of control, which is usually internal 
control, can it be expected that a consistent relationship will be 
found between the two variables. 
Operationalization Difficulties in Attribution Research 
The attempt to independently manipulate internal and external 
attributional states presents certain difficulties because of the 
unobservable and mediating nature of attributions. There appear to 
be three general ways tn achieve such a manipulation: 1) through 
Kellian notions of consistency and distinctiveness, 2) through 
psycholinguistic manipulations and 3) through manipulation of antece-
dent attributional states. Kelley (1967) has defined attributions in 
terms of distinctiveness of entities, consistency over time and 
modality and consensus of other people. MacArthur (1972) has utilized 
these distinctions to manipulate descriptions (in terms of informa-
tion) of behavioral situations in an attempt to create different 
attributional states. She found that person attributions were more 
likely to result from information that depicted low social consensus, 
high consistency over time and modality, and low distinctiveness of 
-9-
entity. On the other hand stimulus attributions were found to result 
from information that reflected high social consensus, high consistency 
over time and modality, and high distinctiveness of entity. Thus, 
using an after paradigm MacArthur was able to manipulate attributional 
states through informational components conforming to the principles 
of consistency and distinctiveness. 
Second, in a series of studies Kanouse has suggested that certain 
linguistic forms may reflect attributional differences. In two early 
studies (Gilson and Abelson, 1965; and Abelson and Kanouse, 1966), 
it was found that certain verb forms create differences in the process 
of generalization. Gilson and Abelson (1965) found that there was 
a greater tendency to agree with inductive inferences (a generaliza-
tion based on preceding sentences with specific pieces of information) 
when manifest (overt, observable actions such as "hit") or positive 
(favorable actions such as "like") verbs were used than when subJective 
(internal states such as "feel") or negative (unfavorable actions 
such as "dislike") verbs were used. In addition, they found that the 
manifest-subJective dimension had the strongest impact on subJect 
rate of agreement with the inductive inferences (as compared with 
the positive-negative dimension). Abelson and Kanouse (1966) 
replicated these findings for inductive inferences. However, when they 
looked at deductive inferences (the application of a previous genera-
lization to a specific instance) they found the positive~negative 
dimension to be the strongest and that negative or subJective verbs 
were more likely to lead to greater agreement with the inference than 
positive or manifest verbs (a mirror image reversal of the previous 
findings). Kanouse (1971) has explained these results in terms of 
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"implicit quantifiers" associated with the verb In other words, 
agreement with a deductive inference is more likely when a subjective 
verb is used because the subjective verb implies a greater degree 
of generalizability than a manifest verb. Kanouse (1972) has demon-
strated that in simple sentences of a deductive nature that 
subjective verbs and negative verbs have greater implicit quantities 
of the object associated with them than manifest and positive verbs 
respectively. This study is consistent with the previous work on 
deductive inferences in all respects except one, the manifest-subjective 
dimension was stronger than the pos1.t1.ve-negat1.ve d1.mens1.on. 
It should be clear that Kanouse's work with verb forms has strong 
implications for resulting attributions because the degree to which 
a verb generalizes the relationship between a subject and an object 
will affect the degree of association between a subject or actor and 
an object or entity. When the relationship between a subject and a 
class of objects is generalized it illustrates a consistent way of 
acting across the class of obJects and thus leads to a person attri-
bution when the subject is a human being. On the other hand when the 
relationship between subject and object does not generalize, the 
relationship is most likely specific to that object and the cause of 
the relationship is more likely to be seen as residing in the object 
(a stimulus attribution). The validity of this type of reasoning 
was demonstrated by MacArthur (1972) when she showed that manifest 
verbs were more likely to lead to person attributions and that subjec-
tive verbs were more likely to lead to stimulus attributions when 
using inductive inferences. 
This work has demonstrated that the syntactical structure (at 
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least verbs) of our language carries with it implicit statements 
about causality and attributions. Kanouse has suggested that other 
syntact~cal forms such as active-passive verbs, adverbial modifiers 
and adJectives may also reflect attributional differences. Thus it 
is clear that the manipulation of linguistic structures is also a 
viable approach to manipulating attributional states. 
Third, it is possible to manipulate attributional states through 
antecedent informational variables (freedom of choice, prior probability, 
magniture of affective consequences, attentional perspective, labeling). 
The use of such methods assumes that a direct relationship exists 
between the antecedent variable and the resulting attributional state. 
One of the most promising of these approaches is provided by the 
manipulation of attentional perspective. This approach consists of 
the use of a number of devices (such as mirrors, manual activity, 
television camaras) to focus the individual's attention upon himself 
or away from himself. The assumption is that when a person's attention 
is focused on himself that he will show a greater tendency to attribute 
the cause of behavior to himself, whereas when the person's attention 
is focused away from himself he will be more likely to see external 
sources as the cause of the action. 
Support for this approach to manipulating attributions has been 
found in the work of Duval and Wicklund (1972). Duval and Wicklund 
(1973) found that when subJects were presented with hypothetical sit-
uations which placed them in the role of actors, that those who worked 
in front of mirrors tended to attribute the behavior in question more 
to themselves than those who did not work in front of mirrors. Further-
more they found this effect to be constant across both positive and 
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and negative behavior situations. Their conclusion is that when a 
subJect's attention is focused on himself (by the mirror) that he is 
more likely to see himself as the source of the action than when his 
attention is focused outward (through the absence of a mirror). Thus, 
it seems that by focusing the individual's attention on himself, a 
mirror can lead to greater internal attributions than would normally 
occur in its absense. 
Hypotheses 
The basic thesis of this study is that behavior which is attributed 
to internal causes instead of external causes will lead to greater and 
longer lasting behavior change. This prediction is made across all 
types of attributional manipulations as long as they are truly success-
ful in changing an individual's attributions. This basic proposition 
leads to three hypotheses in relationship to different types of behavior. 
1) Internally oriented attributional munipulations will lead to 
greater and longer lasting changes in actual behavior than externally 
oriented attributional messages. 
2) Internally oriented attributional manipulations will lead to 
greater and longer lasting changes in verbal behavior than externally 
oriented attributional messages. 
3) Greater consistency will exist between intended behavior and actual 
behavior when the behavior is associated with internal attributions 
than when associated with external attributions. 
CHAPTER II 
A PILOT STUDY 
A pilot study was undertaken to establish the validity of 
hypothesis one concerning actual behavior. The basic experimental 
design consisted of one factor with two levels: an internal oriented 
message and an external oriented message. A linguistic manipulation 
was chosen to attempt to induce differential attributional states. 
It was reasoned that a message which consistently used "you" as the 
subJect of sentences would be one that focused the attention of the 
subject upon himself as an actor in the situation. With attention so 
focused it was expected that more internal attributions would result. 
On the other hand, the use of the onoun "we" in a devisive sense was 
expected to focus the attention of the subjects on external sources 
in the situation. 
The study sought to take advantage of a natural occuring behavior 
situation and thereby avoid the demand characteristics and reactive 
nature of laboratory settings. Therefore the subJects were unaware 
that they were involved in an experimental situation. The setting for 
the experiment consisted of the Novice Debate Tournament at the 
University of Kansas. It involved debate teams from about 20 schools 
in the Middle West. Behavior and the persuasive messages were focused 
on the "ten minute rule" which is an effort to limit the amount of 
preparation time between speeches in a debate. The rule says that a 
team has ten minutes total preparation time in a debate, after which 
the timekeeper starts subtracting from their speaking time. 
Method 
A single factor designed was used for two groups of subJects: 
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1) debaters and 2) judges. The first group consisted of 32 debaters 
from various schools who were participating in the tournament. A debate 
team consists of two people who have an equal number of speeches. The 
second group of subjects consisted of 15 debate Judges who were assigned 
to hear the debate rounds. Assignment to conditions was done on a 
random basis. 
SubJects in the debaters' half of the study were mostly male 
freshmen in college. The Judges' half of the study consisted of 
graduate students and full time faculty members. Again, most of them 
were males. 
Procedures: 
SubJects in the debaters' half of the study were given a written 
message when they registered for the tournament which was anywhere from 
15 minutes to 2 hours before the first debate round. At a general 
meeting approximately 15 minutes before the first round, subJects were 
reminded to read their messages. 
The messages exhorted the debaters to observe the "ten minute 
rule" (a time limit on the amount of time allowed each team for pre-
paration between speeches) and use as little time as possible for 
preparation. The only difference in messages was the consistent 
variation of "we" and "you" as subjects of the sentences (see Appendices 
A and B). 
The dependent behavioral measure for the debaters was the actual 
amount of time they used for preparation in the first round of the debate 
tournament. 
SubJects in the Judges' half of the experiment received their 
messages with their ballots for thenrst round of the tournament. Their 
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messages exhorted them to keep track of the amount of preparation time 
used on an enclosed form and to return the form with their ballot at 
the end of the round. Once again the only difference between internal 
and external conditions was the consistent variation of "we" and "you" 
in the messages (see Appendices C and D). The dependent behavioral 
measure for the Judges was simply whether they returned the "ten minute 
rule" forms or not. 
Results 
Due to the preassignment of subJects to conditions and the failure 
of some debaters to arrive at the tournament, the debaters' half of 
the experiment was left with uneven numbers of subJects in each condi-
tion: 14 in the internal and 18 in the external. Since there were 
fifteen subJects in the Judges' half of the study, the conditions were 
also uneven: 7 in the external condition and 8 in the internal condi-
tion. 
In the debaters' half of the experiment, visual inspection of the 
data made it apparent that another factor was also working in the study: 
the side of the topic the debate team was representing. As a result 
the subJects were divided according to the side they represented, 
resulting in a two factor analysis. A two-way analysis of variance 
was employed with attributional state as one factor and side of the 
topic as the second factor. Means are presented in Table 1. The side 
of the topic represented had a highly significant effect (F = 9.96, 
d.f. 1,30 p <.. .01). The results for the attributional factor were in 
the predicted direction, but failed to reach the .05 level of signifi-
cance (F = 3.10, d.f. 1,30 p<._.08). The interaction was not signifi-




Means for Amount of 




Side of Topict---------f------------1 
Negative 8.01 8.22 
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In the Judges' half of the experiment, 7 out of 8 subJects 
returned their time sheets in the internal condition and 5 out of 
7 subJects returned their time sheets in the external condition. 
This distribution is nonsignificant according to Fisher's Exact 
Probability Test. 
Discussion 
The results of the pilot study lent marginal support to the 
hypothesized relationship between attributions and behavior change. 
While the results were weak, they did show the presence of some 
effect. The strength of this finding was probably affected by many 
factors such as the time interval between message and behavior, 
the sole use of a written message, and the general distractions of 
a debate tournament. As a result of these factors the finding of 
any support for the hypothesis was encouraging. The use of a solely 
linguistic manipulation of attributions seemed to have an effect 




The main study was designed to replicate and extend the findings 
of the pilot study. To do this it was decided to use two manipulations 
of attrib~tions. First a linguistic manipulation was used to create 
''actor'' differences. Second, it was decided to manipulate attributions 
through attentional perspective. On the basis of Duval and Wicklund's 
(1973) finding that those who worked in front of mirrors tended to 
attribute the cause of their behavior to themselves more than those 
who did not work in front of mirrors, it was decided to use mirrors 
as a second way of manipulating attributions. By manipulating linguis-
tic messages and attentional perspective orthogonally it was hoped to 
create a situation where the two means of manipulating attributions 
would demonstrate their effects independently and in combination. 
As a result, a factoral experiment was designed with two mutually 
orthogonal variables: 1) linguistic attributions and 2) attentional 
attributions. The first factor, linguistic attributions, had two 
conditions· a) a message designed to induce an internal attributional 
state and b) a message designed to induce an external attributional 
state. The second factor, attentional perspective, also had two 
conditions: a) one where the subJect worked in front of a mirror and 
b) one where the subJect did not work in front of a mirror. Due to 
theoretical questions of how a mirror interacts with positive and 
negative consequences, it was decided to limit the manipulation to 
positive consequences. This was done by emphasizing the positive 
benefits of the desired behavior in all conditions. 
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Finally, the design of the study sought to utilize a natural 
behavior sequence and thereby avoid many of the demand characteristics 
associated with experimental situations. The study made use of the 
evidence gathering pool of a summer high school debate workshop. The 
workshop was composed of high school students who come from all parts 
of the country to receive instruction in debate theory and work on the 
debate topic for the following year. Students expected to stay for 
either two or four weeks, but worked together for the first two weeks. 
One of the functions of the Institute was to provide the students with 
an opportunity to do research on the debate topic. To facilitate this, 
the Institute set up a central evidence gathering pool. During the 
summer in which this study was conducted, students were issued dittos 
(as many as they could use) on which they typed (or wrote) their pieces 
of research evidence. The dittos were then collected, run off, and 
fifteen copies were distributed to the student who turned them in. 
Students were then encouraged to trade their evidence among themselves. 
The present study utilized this function of the Institute by providing 
messages to the students (the linguistic manipulation) urging them to 
gather large amounts of evidence for the central evidence pool. 
Pledges of intended behavior were obtained to "facilitate the adminis-
tration of the proJect." Furthermore subJects were isolated by them-
selves (in rooms with mirrors or without mirrors) to insure "that they 
made their decisions by themselves." Measures of both intended and 
actual behavior were obtained within this setting. 
The study was initially conducted in the first week of the Institute 
utilizing both two and four week students. It was also decided to 
replicate the original findings during the second two weeks of the 
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Institute with the four week students. Thus the study consisted of 
two parts: 1) part one utilizing all students in the Institute and 
2) part two utilizing only those students who stayed for the second 
two weeks. 
SubJects 
The study began with a pool of 82 subJects taking part in the 
1974 University of Kansas summer high school Speech and Debate Institute. 
Forty-one subJects were in attendance for two weeks and the remaining 
41 were on campus for four weeks. All 82 students were together for 
the first two weeks of the Institute. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to the four experimental 
conditions from seven different classes. Due to the early dismissal 
of one class only 69 subjects participated in the original study. 
One subject was dropped from the 69 because he failed to follow the 
directions for his experimental condition. At the time intended 
behavior was measured there were, therefore, 68 subJects. Three 
subjects left the Institute before actual behavior was measured, 
thus leaving an N of 65. Thirty subJects who participated in part 
one were also in part two, to which were added 10 subJects who had 
not fully participated in part one of the study (due to the dismissal). 
One subJect was lost due to sickness before the measurement of actual 
behavior in part two thus leaving 39. 
Procedures 
The study took place on the first full day of classes for the 
Institute. The experimenters appeared in each class and explained 
that they wanted to present the workshop's central evidence pool 
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system to the students and obtain their initial pledges. It was 
further explained that since past experience had shown that students 
tended to make the same choices when working together it was necessary 
to have each individual makeln.s pledge by himself. At this point 
the subjects were randomly divided between the two experimenters with 
one E taking subjects to rooms without mirrors and the other E 
taking subjects to rooms with mirrors. As each student entered his room 
he was handed a sheet of paper containing one of the two linguistic 
manipulations. In each of the attentional conditions, half of the 
subjects received internal messages and half received external messages. 
The non mirror conditions concsisted of ordinary class rooms, while the 
mirror conditions used experimental rooms equipped with two-way mirrors. 
In the mirror conditions lights were adJusted so that the two-way 
mirrors operated as mirrors for the subjects. (It was obvious to most 
subJects that the mirrors were not being operated as two-way mirrors 
for purposes of observation). To make sure that the subJects were 
aware of the mirrors, only one chair and one table were present in 
each room placed directly in front of the mirrors. In addition, the 
E made a casual comment to each subject about the presence of the 
mirror. 
Upon completion of the forms the subjects turned them into the 
experimenters and were instructed to go to the library. They were 
asked to leave the building to avoid interaction with those subjects 
who had not yet taken part in the study. 
Over the next week dittos were distributed to the subJects for 
them to type their evidence on. One week later the dittos were 
collected, reproduced and returned to the students. While being 
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reproduced, a count was made of the amount of evidence each subJect 
turned in which provided the measure of actual behavior 
The procedures for part two were identical for those of part one 
except in two instances. First, subJects were divided into cells 
before the actual experiment on the basis of what cell they had been 
in in part one, or if not in part one, to obtain equal cell distribu-
tions. Second, the messages were rewritten to include assurance of 
anonymity and requests for signatures were removed from the bottom 
of the messages. Messages were numbered, each subJect was given a 
number, and the appropriate messages were given to the subJects. 
The subjects were also told to leave the completed forms in a box 
instead of returning them to the experimenters. 
Instruments 
Two forms of the linguistic message were constructed to manipulate 
internal and external attributional states through linguistic varia-
tions. The basic message explained the details of the evidence pooling 
proJect, encouraged the students to participate, and asked them for 
a pledge of how much evidence they intended to gather. In the internal 
attribution message (see Appendix E) the linguistic structure was 
designed to place the subJect in the position of an actor and thus 
provide him with internal reasons to collect evidence. This was done 
by using the grammatical subJect "you" as often as possible while 
showing positive intrinsic effects and consequences resulting from the 
desired behavior. 
In the external attributional message (see Appendix F) the 
linguistic structure was varied so as to place emphasis on the 
Institute as the actor and provide the subJect with externally oriented 
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reasons for collecting evidence. To create this effect the subJect 
"we" was used as much as possible and the reasons for performing the 
behavior were oriented to the benefits that the group would receive 
from the desired action. 
The bottom of each message contained a line for the subJect to 
indicate how many pieces of evidence he intended to turn in and a 
line for him to sign on. This constituted the dependent measure of 
intended behavior. Such a pledge is analogous to the signed release 
forms used by DeFleur and Westie (1958) in their studies of attitudes 
and behavior. The rationale behind it is that in our society a signed 
commitment to do a behavior has a quasi-legal flavor to it and consti-
tutes a form of behavior in itself. The second form of behavioral 
analysis consisted of the actual amount of behavior the subJects 
performed over the next two weeks. In this study no observation of 
the subjects was necessary to obtain this behavior measure because it 
consisted of the number of pieces of evidence that each subJect turned 
in. The lack of need for observation and the interval level scaling 
of the actual behavior overcame many of the scaling and validity 
problems often associated with obtaining artifactual evidence of 
human behavior. 
In part two of the study some changes were made in the messages. 
References were made to the previous message, reasons for doing the 
proJect were reiterated, and procedures to be followed were outlined 
(see Appendices G and H). The main change was the inclusion of the 
following sentence, "Since the number of cards you do is your personal 
business, you need not sign this form and can place it anonymously in 
the box outside the room." Such a change was an effort to reduce any 
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effects due to conformity and pressure from the administration of the 
Institute, 
As a result of these changes the dependent measure for intended 
behavior changed from the signed form of behavior to a form lacking 
a public commitment. While this change was made subjects seemed to 
treat the commitment in a similar manner in both parts one and two 
(with some subJects still signing the form in part two). 
Data Analysis 
The basic form of data analysis for this study consisted of two 
and three way analyses of variance for unequal cell sizes using 
harmonic means (Winer, 1971; pp. 445-449). When the analysis of 
variance effects were found to be significant they were further 
analyzed by decomposing them into appropriate two way analyses of 
variance or analyses of simple main effects. 
In all cases the distribution of the scores in each sample was 
graphed to determine the shape of the distribution, In most cases the 
data were not found to be distributed as a normal curve; instead the 
scores usually approximated a positive skew. As a result the data was 
usually transformed with an appropriate transformation to reduce the 
variability in scores, Appropriate transformations were determined 
through the use of range scores (Winer, 1971; pp. 397-402). After 
transformations the data was usually resubmitted to analysis of 
variance, 
In certain cases the data was also analyzed using non-parametric 
tests with results paralleling the parametric tests. Greater use of 
non-parametric tests was not made because. 1) many of the same effects 
could be achieved through transformations, 2) the parametric statistics 
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are more powerful, 3) the parametric statistics are highly robust, 
and 4) the tendency for the non-parametric statistics to parallel 




The means for intended behavior of the four groups in part one 
are presented in Table 2. It can be seen that the greatest amounts 
of intended behavior were performed in the non mirror-external condi-
tionsandthat the lowest amounts of intended behavior occured in the 
mirror-external condition. 
Analysis of variance for intended behavior in part one revealed 
no significant differences for main effects or interactions (all 
tables for analyses of variance are presented in Appendix I). 
Differences between the mirror and non mirror conditions were also 
tested using a non-parametric statistic, the chi square, but failed 
to show any significant results (x2 = 3.12, d.f. 3, p<.n.s.). 
This means for intended behavior seemed to show differences 
between experimental conditions, but skewed distributions of scores 
and heterogeneity of variance may have obscured the statistical 
analysis of differences. This lead to the repetition of the study 
for the four week subJects with the changes outlined earlier. The 
means for part two intended behavior scores are presented in Table 3. 
The pattern of scores closely resembles the original pattern of scores 
suggesting a reliable replication of the original variables affecting 
the outcomes. The only maJor difference was that the scores tended 
to be lower than for part one, which may suggest a more conservative 
estimate of intended behavior in part two~ more in line with the 
subject's recent experience. Once again the highest intended behavior 
score was in the non mirror-external message condition and the lowest 
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Means and Number of SubJects for Intended 
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score was in the mirror-external message condition. 
Results of the two-way analysis of variance for intended behavior 
in part two revealed two significant results. 1) a main effect for 
attentional perspective (F = 5.96, d.f. 1,36 pL.02) and 2) an inter-
action between attentional perspective and linguistic message (F = 
4.17 d.f. 1,36 p~.05). The main effect indicated that those subJects 
who did not work in front of a mirror had higher intended behavior 
scores than those who did work in front of a mirror. Thus the presence 
of the mirror depressed the intended behavior of the subJects. The 
significant interaction revealed that the main effect for attentional 
perspective was affected by the nature of the linguistic message 
presented to the subJects. SubJects in the external message condition 
were most affected by the mirror. Specifically, those with no mirror 
who received the external message intended to do the most, whereas 
those who received the external message with a mirror before them 
intended to do the least. Figure 1 pictures this relationship. 
Computation of simple main effects revealed that the effect for 
external messages was significantly affected by the attentional 
perspective of the subject (F = 10.0 d.f. 1 36 pL.003). 
While the pattern of data was the same for both samples of 
intended behavior, the findings of significant results in part two 
(composed solely of four week subJects) raised the question of whether 
the expected length of stay at the Institute had any effect upon the 
distribution of scores. As a result, the original sample was redivided 
with the addition of a third factor, the expected length of stay at 
the Institute. The means from the three factor analysis are presented 
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maJor differences between the two week subJects and the four week 
subJects in three out of four of the original experimental condi-
t1ons(w1th only the non mirror-external condition remaining constant). 
A three-way analysis of variance on intended behavior for part one 
failed to yield any significant main effects or interactions. 
On the whole the data failed to support the hypothesized 
relationship between intended behavior and the independent variables. 
The two significant findings for the second part contradicted the 
hypothesized relationship in that the main effect for attentional 
perspective showed greater intended behavior in the non mirror 
condition than in the mirror condition. The interaction showed a 
stable effect for the internal message across both attentional 
perspectives, but the external message showed a highly volatile 
effect across both attentional perspectives. Only within the mirror 
condition did the hypothesized pattern of internal and external 
1 
attributional message effects materalize. 
Actual Behavior 
Means for actual behavior as recorded at the end of the first 
two weeks are presented in Table 5. They reveal a picture somewhat 
similar to that for intended behavior, i.e. means are higher for the 
non mirror conditions than for the mirror conditions and higher for 
the internal message conditions than for external message conditions. 
Nevertheless, the two-way analysis of variance for actual behavior 
in part one revealed no significant main effects or interactions. 
Means for actual behavior in part two are presented in Table 6. 
The greatest actual behavior was in the non mirror-internal message 
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revealed a significant interaction between attentional perspective 
and linguistic messages (F = 8.49 d.f. 1,35 p <:..006). 
Tests for simple main effects showed the interaction to be due 
to the effect of different attentional perspectives in the internal 
message condition (F = 8.39 d.f. 1,35 p(..006). This is pictured 
in Figure 2. 
As with earlier analyses, the data for actual behavior in part 
one was redivided to add expected length of stay at the Institute 
as a third variable. Means for the behavioral data are presented 
in Table 7. The three-way analysis of variance for this data revealed 
two significant results: 1) a main effect for the expected length 
of stay (F = 3.80 d.f. 1,57 pL,..06), and 2) an interaction between 
attentional perspective and expected length of stay (F = 5.32 d.f. 
1,57 p~.02). These results show that the two week subJects were more 
likely to have higher actual behavior scores than the four week 
subJects. Furthermore, the pattern of results is similar to the two 
factor pattern for two week subjects, but contains some maJor differen-
ces for the four week subJects. Specifically, the non mirror condi-
tions had much lower actual behavior scores among the four week subJects. 
The profile for the interaction is presented in Figure 3. The 
simple main effect for length of stay in the non mirror condition 
was highly significant (F = 42.52, d.f. 1,57 p..(.0001). Thus subJects 
in the mirror condition were fairly stable in their a::tual behavior 
across all conditions, but subJects in the non mirror condition were 
highly affected by their expected length of stay. 
Finally, the three-way analysis of variance was split into two 
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for the four week subJects. The only effect that approached 
significance was the main effect for the attentional perspective 
condition for the two week subJects (F = 3.21 d.f. 1,30 p<.OB). 
The results for actual behavior provide mixed support for the 
hypothesized effects. The significant interaction between atten-
tional perspective and expected length of stay in part one shows 
the predicted pattern of effects for attentional perspective among 
the four week subJects, but the opposite pattern of results for the 
two week subjects. On the whole, the results for linguistic messages 
in part one are in the right direction even though failing to reach 
conventional levels of significance. The significant interaction in 
part two between attentional perspective and linguistic messages 
reflects the fact that linguistic messages had the predicted pattern 
of results in the non mirror condition, but the opposite pattern of 
results in the mirror condition. Thus, the predicted pattern of 
results for actual behavior seems to prevail under certain circumstances 
and not under others. 
Relationships between Intended Behavior and Actual Behavior 
The relationship between intended behavior and actual behavior 
was explored by computing actual behavior scores as a percentage of 
intended behavior scores. The mean percentages for each experimental 
condition are presented in Table 8. They show a somewhat different 
pattern of results than were found for intended behavior or actual 
behavior alone. The highest percentage is in the mirror-internal 
message condition and the lowest percentage is in the non mirror 
external message condition. Distribution of percentages seemed to 
conform to the predicted relationship, but the two-way analysis of 
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The means for the three factor breakdown of the data are presented 
in Table 9. The three-way analysis of variance for this data revealed 
that the attentional perspective by length of stay interaction was 
6.98 d.f. 1,57 p<.0l) SubJects expecting 
to stay two weeks did a greater percentage of intended behavior in 
the non mirror condition while subJects expecting to stay four weeks 
did a greater percentage of intended behavior in the mirror condition 
Tests of simple main effects for this interaction showed that the 
effect for the mirror condition on both two week subJects (F = 7.04 
d.f. 1,57 p(..01) and four week subJects was significant (F = 27.58 
d.f. 1,57 p<:._.0001). 
The three-way interaction between attentional perspective, 
linguistic messages and expected length of stay approached significance 
(F = 3.16 d.f. 1,57 p<.08). This effect seemed to reflect the fact 
that in those conditions where behavior levels were highest (the two 
week non mirror and the four week mirror), the internal linguistic 
message lead to greater consistency between intended behavior and 
actual behavior. 
Means for percentage behavior in the second two weeks of the 
Institute are presented in Table 10. The two-way analysis of variance 
for the data showed a significant interaction between attentional 
perspective and linguistic messages (F = 3.88 d.f. 1,35 p<.06). 
It appears that the internal message was most effective in leading 
to consistent behavior in the non mirror condition and that the 
external message was most effective in leading to consistent behavior 
in the mirror condition. 
When the intended behavior and actual behavior for the two parts 
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the study are combined for those subJects who were in both parts of 
the study, the resulting percentages are presented in Table 11. They 
show that the two greatest overall percentages occurred in the mirror 
condition with the mirror-external condition having the highest overall 
percentage. However, the analysis of variance for this data failed 
to show any significant results. 
The relationship between intended behavior and actual behavior 
was further explored through correlations between the two forms of 
behavior. The results are presented in Table 12. Correlations for 
all conditions in part one revealed significant relationships except 
in the non mirror-internal message group. When these groups were 
divided into two and four week subJects, it was discovered that the 
correlations for the four week subJects fell to non-significant levels. 
Correlations for the second part of the experiment revealed a general 
pattern of negative relationships, but only one approached signifi-
cance, the mirror-internal condition. 
Overall the results concerning the consistency between intended 
behavior and actual behavior showed some support for the hypothesized 
effects. The general pattern of relationships for part one conformed 
to the predicted pattern. When the experimental conditions were 
divided on the basis of expected length of stay, it was found that 
the relationship was markedly different for two week subJects as 
opposed to four week subJects. As reflected in the significant length 
of stay by attentional perspective interaction, the mirror condition 
was found to yield results in the predicted pattern for four week 
subJects but in the opposite pattern for two week subJects. However, 
for both two and four week subJects the internal message was found to 
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Pearson Product Moment Correlations for 
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Part One .54 (17) 
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the near significant three-way interaction between attentional 
perspective, linguistic messages, and expected length of stay. 
The percentages found in part two seemed to reflect a compensating 




In explaining the findings of this study it is necessary to try 
to reconstruct the enviornmental interpretations the subJects placed 
on the situation they found themselves in. While it is impossible 
to fully reconstruct such cognitive functionings, it is necessary 
to come to some general understanding of the variables that the 
individual encountered in the situation andthe resulting interactive 
relationship between these variables and the individual. The inter-
action between these variables and the individual creates the person's 
symbolic world which in turn becomes reality for him. It was the 
symbolic reality created by attributions that this study set out to 
explore and it is only by placing the attributional system of the 
person within this symbolic world that it is possible to even partially 
understand the person's behavior, The following discussion of results 
is built on the assumption that it is necessary to reconstruct such 
a symbolic world on the basis of the variables known to be operating 
in the situation and evident in the findings. 
To begin with it is necessary to postulate a set of generalized 
expectations that formed the basis of the subJects' symbolic reality 
as they entered the study. The subjects' expected length of stay at 
the Institute obviously influenced their general set. The analysis 
of data in terms of expected length of stay at the Institute revealed 
that whether the subJects expected to stay two or four weeks had a 
strong influence on their subsequent behavior. SubJects who expected 
to stay for two weeks were aware of the fact that whatever work they 
would accomplish at the Institute would occur within the time period 
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of part one (the "now or never" effect). Furthermore, their orienta-
tion probably involved an expectation to fulfill whatever commitments 
they made in the first two weeks. On the other hand, subJects who 
expected to stay for four weeks were more likely to put things off 
and feel that they had plenty of time to do them (the "procrastination" 
effect). As a result the commitment to fulfill intended behavior 
would be felt less strongly among the four week subJects than among 
the two week subJects. The results of such generalized expectations 
can be seen most clearly in the three-way analysis of variance for 
actual behavior in part one. Here a main effect was obtained for 
expected length of stay with the finding that two week students turned 
in more evidence than did four week students. It seems that two 
week subjects were more likely to perform because it presented their 
only chance to do so whereas the four week subJects had another two 
weeks in which to meet goals. 
Upon entering the experiment the subJect encountered situational 
elements that apparently interacted with his expectations. The 
situation contained two elements that combined to produce a general 
situational norm or expectation about behavior. While this experiment 
utilized a naturalistic setting and thereby avoided the demand 
characteristics associated with such a situation, it could not 
eliminate the demand characteristics induced by the fact that the 
director and assistant director of the Institute served as the experi-
menters. Furthermore, the messages which argued for high levels of 
behavior were presented as coming from the Institute and therefore 
created expectations of high levels ofl:ehavior. In addition the 
signed measures of intended behavior were collected by the experimenters 
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in part one thereby making it clear that the administrators of the 
Institute would know how much work subjects intended to do. The 
result of all this is a situation where the authority of the Institute 
and its administrators was placed behind the nonn of high amounts of 
behavior with the awareness that levels of intended behavior would 
be readily known. This variable had its most readily apparent effect 
on intended behavior in that it created normative expectations about 
how much evidence the subJect should promise to produce in the next 
two weeks. The expectation resulted in estimates of intended behavior 
in part one that were much higher than actual behavior or intended 
behavior in part two. In the non mirror conditions where the physical 
circumstances were more "normal" and one might expect greater atten-
tion to Institute demand variables, there were higher intended behavior 
scores than in the mirror condition. 
Whether the normative expectation was translated into actual 
behavior seemed to depend on whether it was combined with the "now 
or never" attitude of the two week subjects or the "procrastination" 
attitude of the four week subJects. This interpretation is supported 
by the previously discussed main effect for length of stay on actual 
behavior. The generalized expectations seem to provide the motivation 
and commitment to carry out (or not carry out) the normative behavior 
of the situation. 
The two factors discussed so far are considered as operating 
intrinsic to the natural situation that this experiment utilized. 
At this point we shall consider the two experimental variables, 
attentional perspective and linguistic messages, as factors introduced 
into the situation and interacting with the already existing variables. 
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It was initially hypothesized that greater amounts of the encouraged 
behavior would occur when the subJect was exposed to the mirror than 
when he worked without it. However the results of the experiment 
showed the mirror manipulation working both ways depending upon what 
other variables it was combined with. In part one the mirror condi-
tions interacted with the length of stay to produce higher actual 
behavior and percentages in the non mirror condition for two week 
subJects and in the mirror condition for four week subJects. 
To explain this behavior it is necessary to explore the possible 
effects that the mirror can have upon the various types of behavior 
in this situation. Duval and Wicklund (1972) have argued that the 
presence of a mirror will induce a state of obJective self-awareness 
whereas the absence of a mirror will induce a state of subJective 
self-awareness. They have further argued that in the state of obJective 
self-awareness the person views himself as an object which he compares 
with his personal standards of correctness, whereas in the subJective 
self-awareness state the individual reacts to situations subJectively 
and views his behavior in response to Environmental pressures. Accord-
ing to Duval and Wicklund (1972) the discrepancy between self percep-
tions and standards of correctness observed in the state of obJective 
self-awareness is aversive and leads the person to either alter his 
behavior or leave the situation. In examining the experimental 
situation in this study, it is difficult to decide what might be 
the standards of correctness the individual used to Judge himself 
as an obJect. It is possible that the situational nonn for high 
levels of behavior might correspond closely enough with personal 
l 
beliefs to create such a standard of correctness. If this were true 
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it would be expected that the subJects would set high standards of 
behavior in an attempt to remove the discrepancy between this standard 
and their personal behavior. However the data do not support this 
interpretation. 
While it is possible that other standards of correctness were 
operating in this situation let us suppose that the person ohose the 
other alternative to altering his behavior, leaving the situation. 
It has been argued recently (Liebling, Seiler, and Shaver, 1974) 
that subJects may attempt to symbolically leave the situation by 
being distracted to some other stimuli in the situation. There is 
some observational evidence that the subJects in this study used the 
messages as a source of distraction to avoid looking at the mirror. 
It was observed that most subJects in the mirror condition made a 
conscious effort to not look at themselves in the mirror and buried 
their heads in the message. If this were true a differential effect 
for the linguistic messages would be found only in the mirror condition, 
however this was not found to be true. 
It has been suggested by others that the mirror has a distracting 
effect upon whatever activities are going on in its presence. If 
this is true, differential effects from other variables in the situa-
tion should be wiped out. However in this experiment differential 
, 
effects existed for internal and external message conditions across 
the mirror conditions. Another effect that has been attributed to 
mirrors by some is the lowering of self esteem levels. Some studies 
have shown that when a person's self esteem is temporarily lowered 
that he becomes more susceptible to persuasion attempts (McGuire, 
1968; p. 250). If this is true it would be expected that subJects in 
the mirror condition would react to the persuasive message by performing 
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higher amounts of behavior than in the non mirror condition. However, 
the results of this study showed otherwise. Finally others have 
argued that the mirror leads to arousal which triggers a generalized 
drive response leading to the activation of whatever learned 
responses are associated with the situation (Liebling, Seiler and 
Shaver, 1974). The learned responses associated with this situation 
may involve the tendency to be hesitant in situations that call for 
some form of commitment. While such a response would probably lead 
to more conservative behavior, to the degree it involves a commitment, 
that commitment would be stronger because of its association with 
internal aspects of the person. In this study such an effect would 
lead to levels of intended behavior lower for mirror subJects than 
for non mirror subjects but levels of actual behavior more consistent 
with intended behavior for mirror subJects than for non mirror subJects. 
In general this pattern seemed to hold for the results of this study. 
In summary, the effect for the mirror seemed to be a combination 
of a drive response and self awareness. If such an effect for the 
mirror existed then it would be expected that the levels of intended 
behavior would be lower for the mirror condition than for the non 
mirror condition (when a norm of high behavior expectations exists). 
For actual behavior, levels would be expected to be stable across 
the mirror condition (because of the consistent levels of commitment) 
which conforms to the data. Such an explanation for the effects of 
the mirror can be combined with the previously discussed factors to 
explain the interaction between the attentional perspective condition 
and the expected length of stay. In general intended behavior levels 
were lower for the mirror condition because of the conservative attitude 
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resulting from the drive level while the actual behavior was stable 
and consistent across all conditions because of the degree of commit-
ment associated with them. Two week non mirror condition subJects 
seemed to have been primarily influenced by the situational norm and 
their commitment to achieve something in two weeks, Thus the resulting 
behavior levels (both intended and actual) were higher than for compar-
able two week mirror subJects. On the other hand, four week subJects 
seemed to find their high response to the situational norm (in terms 
of high intended behavior) eroded by their general expectation that 
they would have two more weeks to achieve things (the "procrastination" 
effect), As a result low levels of actual behavior were found, lower 
than for mirror subJects in comparable four week conditions where some 
commitment seemed to result. A similar effect for mirrors has been 
found by Liebling and Shaver (1973). They discovered that the mirror 
interacted with evaluation to determine levels of behavior. Specifi-
cally the mirror tended to stablize behavior across both levels of 
evaluation while high evaluative conditions lead to greater behavior 
in the non mirror condition and low evaluative conditions lead to less 
behavior in the non mirror condition. Thus, the mirror seemed to 
interact with the situational norms present to create the final 
levels of behavior. 
It is appropriate to consider the final variable, the linguistic 
messages, last, because it seemed to have its effect only in combina-
tion with other variables. In terms of part one the expected pattern 
of internal messages was found across levels of the other variables 
where the greatest behavior change occurred. For intended behavior, 
this was true across all conditions except the two week, non mirror 
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condition, which was also the cell where the external situational norm 
would be expected to have its strongest effect. In addition, the 
intended behavior for the internal two week, non mirror group was 
quite high for intended behavior conditions. For actual behavior 
the predicted pattern was true for all conditions except the four 
week non mirror condition where the "procrastination" effect had its 
strongest impact. Finally the same pattern holds true for percen-
tages in all conditions except the four week non mirror condition 
where the scores are a result of the discrepancy between intended 
behavior (which resulted from the situational norm) and actual behavior 
(which resulted from the procrastination effect). On the whole the 
linguistic variable seemed to have the greatest effect within the 
mirror condition. 
Part two of the experiment showed a general reversal of the 
pattern of effects found for the linguistic messages in part one. 
For intended behavior (expect the mirror condition), actual behavior, 
and the percentages, the pattern of internal and external message 
effects is reversed. For example, in the four week mirror-internal 
condition which had the highest percentage in part one (102%) had 
the lowest percentage in part two (26%) whereas the four week non 
mirror-internal condition which had the lowest percentage in part one 
(31%) had one of the highest percentages in part two (62%). These 
effects seemed to reflect feelings of "I've done enough" or "I've 
got one more chance." 
In conclusion the results found in this study seem to be the 
end product of several variables operating in the situation and the 
experimental structure. In many ways the situational variables seem 
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to have been the strongest with the experimental variables serving to 
alter the already existing structure. 
Out of the findings discussed in this study we shall tentatively 
advance several conclusions to guide further research. First, attribu-
tional effects upon intended behavior seem the hardest to gauge. When-
ever any credibility, conformity or situational norm is present it 
seems to have a much greater impact upon levels of intended behavior 
than purely differential attributions to internal or external causes. 
It is only when attributions are linked to such other variables that 
their impact is felt, e.g. the interaction between expected length of 
stay and the attributional manipulations. 
Second, actual behavior seems to be more strongly influenced 
by the manipulations than intended behavior. There is evidence that 
the mirror condition had a stabling effect upon actual behavior. 
Whether this effect was stronger or weaker than the non mirror condition 
seemed to dependent upon whether the other variables present (e.g. 
situation norms and generalized expectations) worked to promote high 
or low levels of behavior. 
Third, attributions seemed to have their greatest effect upon the 
consistency between intended behavior and actual behavior. In general 
those conditionswhereinternal attributions were manipulated seemed 
to be the conditions where the greatest consistency existed between 
intended behavior and actual behavior. This effect seemed to exist for 
both attentional perspective and linguistic messages. 
Fourth, the mirror manipulation is highly ambiguous in terms of 
the type of effect it has and the reasons for this effect. It seems 
to have a conservative effect upon levels of behavior but it also 
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seems to have a stabilizing effect across conditions. While the 
various possible effects that could be resulting from the mirror are 
discussed it is not wholly clear which ones are operating in this 
study. 
Fifth, the linguistic manipulation of attributions seems to 
have a fairly weak effect upon behavior. In those cases where its 
effect had significant results it was only in combination with other 
variables. While it is unclear as to the strength of the particular 
manipulations used it is possible that linguistic manipulations of 
attributions have their greatest effect when other information is 
lacking and serve primarily to determine the direction of behavior 
when combined with other variables. 
Sixth, there is a great need for research on the relationship 
between manipulations of attributions, i.e. attentional perspective 
and linguistic messages, and the resulting attributional states. 
As used in this study only indirect evidence existed as to these 
relationships. Until this link is strongly established it is 
impossible to argue conclusively for particular relationships between 
attributions and behavior. 
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APPENDIX A 
Debaters' Message for Internal Condition 
in Pilot Study 
TIME INSTRUCTIONS 
YOU, THE DEBATERS OF THIS TOURNAMENT, CAN AND WE HOPE WILL TRY TO SEE THAT 
THIS TOURNAMENT RUNS ON TIME THROUGH THE USE OF THE TEN MINUTE RULE. THE 
LESS TIME YOU SPEND IN PREPARATION, THE MORE EFFICIENT THE TOURNAMENT WILL 
RUN AND THE MORE ENJOYABLE THIS EXPERIENCE WILL BE FOR YOU. YOU, THE 
DEBATERS, CAN MAKE THIS TOURNAMENT RUN ON TIME IF YOU MAKE AN EFFORT TO 
OBSERVE THE TEN MINUTE RULE. 
APPENDIX B 
Debaters' Message for External Condition 
in Pilot Study 
TIME INSTRUCTIONS 
WE, THE TOURNAMENT STAFF, CAN AND WILL TRY TO SEE THAT THIS TOURNAMENT 
RUNS ON TIME THROUGH THE USE OF THE TEN MINUTE RULE. THE LESS TIME SPENT 
IN PREPARATION, THE MORE EFFICIENT THE TOURNAMENT WILL RUN AND THE MORE 
ENJOYABLE THIS EXPERIENCE WILL BE. WE, THE TOURNAMENT STAFF, BELIEVE 
THAT THE TOURNAMENT CAN RUN ON TIME, IF ANEFFORT IS MADE TO OBSERVE THE 
TEN MINUTE RULE. 
APPENDIX C 
Judges' Message for Internal Condition 
in Pilot Study 
Judges Instructions 
You, the Judges of this tournament, can help us find out how effective the 
ten minute rule is by keeping track of how well it is being observed. You 
can do this by keeping track how much of the ten minutes each team is using. 
So would you please keep track of each team's use of time on the enclosed 
sheet of paper and return it with your ballot at the end of the round. 












Judge _____________ _ 











Negative ___________ _ 
Room --------------
APPENDIX D 
Judges' Message for External Condition 
in Pilot Study 
Judges Instructions 
We, the tournament staff, are trying to find out how effective the ten 
minute rule is by keeping track of how well it is being observed We 
can do this only if we know how much of the ten minutes each team is 
using. So would you please keep track of each team's use of time on 
the enclosed sheet of paper and return it with your ballot at the end 
of the round. 























Affirmative Time Used 
Negative ___________ _ 
Room 
APPENDIX E 
Internal L1ngu1st1c Message 
for Part One 
Research is one of the most important aspects of this Summer Debate 
Institute. Those who work the hardest tend to become the best debaters. 
You can maximize your research through the Institute's central evidence 
pool. To do this, you will need to agree to type evidence on dittos that 
will be supplied to you. Your typed dittos will be collected next Monday, 
and copies of the evidence will be returned to you next Wednesday. You 
will then be able to trade the dittoed evidence with other Institute 
members and thereby increase the amount of new evidence you have. 
You can make this proJect a success by researching a large amount of 
evidence. Your commitment, below, for the amount of evidence you intend 
on turning in can help us arrange for the success of this proJect. You 
will find blanks below for your commitment and signature. 
1 Number of pieces of evidence 
I will turn in: Signature 
APPENDIX F 
External Linguistic Message 
for Part One 
Research is one of the most important aspects of this Institute. 
Those who work the hardest make the greatest contribution to the Institute. 
We can maximize debaters' research through the Institute's central evidence 
pool. To do this we will supply each debater with dittos which can be 
used to type evidence on. We will then collect the typed dittos next 
Monday and return copies of the evidence to each debater next Wednesday. 
These can then be traded with other Institute members and thereby increase 
the amount of new evidence available in the Workshop. 
We can make this proJect a success if each debater will commit 
himself/herself to researching a large amount of evidence To help us 
arrange for this proJect we need commitments for the amount of evidence 
that each person expects to turn in. A blank is listed below for each 
debater's commitment of the amount of evidence and a blank for each debater's 
signature. 
Number of pieces of evidence 
to be turned in: Signature 
APPENDIX G 
Internal L1ngu1st1c Message 
for Part Two 
You will be able to participate in the central evidence pool again 
for the next two weeks. You will once again have the chance to increase 
your amount of evidence by trading with other Institute Members. Obviously 
the more evidence you put on dittos the more you have to trade with other 
debaters. 
Dittos will be distributed this week and collected by next Monday 
with copies returned the following day. Since the number of cards you 
do is your personal business, you need not sign this form and can place it 
anonymously in the box outside the room. The only reason for indicating 
the number of cards you intend to do is to help make arrangements for the 
number of dittos and amount of paper needed. The number of cards you 
intend to do is purely for your benefit. 
Number of pieces of evidence 
I will turn in: 
APPENDIX H 
External Linguistic Message 
for Part Two 
We are continuing the central evidence pool again for the next two 
weeks. Institute members will once again have the chance to increase 
their amount of evidence by trading. Obviously the more evidence turned 
in to us, the more evidence there will be available in the Institute. 
Dittos will be distributed this weekend collected by next Monday with 
copies returned the following day. Since the number of cards done is a 
personal matter, we do not need signatures on these forms which can then 
be placed anonymously in the box outside the room. The only reason for 
indicating the number of cards to be done is to help us in making arrange-
ments for the number of dittos and amount of paper needed. The only benefit 
from the amount of evidence turned in to us is for the members of the 
Institute. 
Number of pieces of evidence to be 
turned in· 
APPENDIX I 
Analysis of Variance 
Analysis of Variance for Intended 
Behavior Part One 
ss df MS F p 
Attention 2552.42 1 2552 42 53 n.s. 
Linguistic 679 94 1 679.94 .14 n.s. 
Attention x 
Linguistic 1761.09 1 1761.09 .36 n.s. 
Error 
Within 305738 64 4777 00 
Analysis of Variance for Transformed 
(Log10) Intended Behavior Part One 
ss df MS F p 
Attention 2125 1 .2125 1.49 n.s . 
Linguistic .0017 1 . 0017 .01 n.s. 
Attention x 
Linguistic .0282 1 .0282 .20 n.s. 
Error 













Analysis of Variance for Intended 
Behavior in Part Two 
ss df MS F 
3553 20 1 3553.20 3.68 
.20 1 .20 0 
1755.70 1 1755.70 1. 82 
34749 36 965. 25 
Analysis of Variance for Transformed (1/x) 
Intended Behavior in Part Two 
ss df MS F 
.000930 1 .000930 5.96 
.000210 1 .000210 1.35 
.000650 1 .000650 4.17 





























Three-Way Analysis of Variance for 
Intended Behavior in Part One 
ss df MS F 
9239.67 1 9239.67 2.06 
400.12 1 400.12 .09 
46.54 1 46.54 .01 
672. 20 1 672.20 .15 
10355 06 1 10355.06 2.31 
1727.13 1 1727 .13 .39 
3481.16 1 3481.16 .78 
25998.98 60 4481.55 
Analysis of Variance for Actual 
Behavior in Part One 
ss 1 df MS F 
442.34 1 442.34 .52 
362.52 1 362.52 .43 
36.57 1 36.57 .04 

























Analysis of Variance for Actual 
Behavior in Part Two 
ss df MS F 
586.28 1 586.28 1. 61 
15.32 1 15.32 . 04 
966 .14 1 966.14 2.66 
12732 35 363. 77 
Analysis of Variance for Transformed (1/x+l) 
Actual Behavior in Part Two 
ss df MS F 
.2738 1 .2738 1.40 
.0453 1 • 0453 .23 
1.6607 1 1. 6607 8.49 
6.8455 36 .1956 
E 





















Three-Way Analysis of Variance for 
Actual Behavior in Part One 
ss df MS F 
318.07 1 318. 07 .44 
206.25 1 206.25 .28 
2762.78 1 2762.78 3.80 
128.97 1 128.97 .18 
3867.61 1 3867.61 5.32 
361.90 1 361.90 .50 
405.86 1 405.86 .56 
9860.95 57 726. 42 
Analysis of Variance for Actual 
p 
n.s 






Behavior as Percentage of Intended Behavior Part One 
ss df MS F E 
Attention .159 1 .159 .54 n. s • 
Linguistic .318 1 . 318 1.09 n. s. 
Attention x 
Linguistic .159 1 .159 .54 n. s. 
Error 
Within 17.82 61 . 292 
Analysis of Variance for Transformed (Arc Sin) 





















ss df MS F p 
.9143 1 .9143 .38 n. s. 
3.5346 1 3.5346 1.45 n.s. 
.1639 1 .1639 .07 n.s. 
148.55 61 2.435 
Three-Way Analysis of Variance for Actual Behavior 
as Percentage of Intended Behavior in Part One 
ss df MS F p 
1646.50 1 1646.50 .63 n.s. 
3277. 62 1 3277. 62 1.25 n.s. 
196 .13 1 196.13 .07 n.s. 
185.78 1 185.78 .07 n.s. 
18336.53 1 18336.53 6.98 .01 
203.50 1 203.50 .08 n. s. 
8299.22 1 8299.22 3.16 .08 
32280.95 57 2627.11 
Analysis of Variance for Actual Behavior 
as Percentage of Intended Behavior in Part Two 
ss df MS F p 
Attention .0156 1 .0156 04 n.s • 
Linguistic • 0788 1 .0788 .20 n. s I 
Attention x 
Linguistic 1.5568 1 1.5568 3.88 .06 
Error 
Within 14.06 35 .4016 
